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Norming ‘‘Moderation’’ in an ‘‘Iconic Target’’:
Public Policy and the Regulation of Religious
Anxieties in Singapore
EUGENE K. B. TAN
School of Law, Singapore Management University, Singapore
The maintenance of a ‘‘moderate mainstream’’ Muslim community as a bulwark
against the fraying of harmonious ethnic relations has become a key governance con-
cern post-September 11. In light of the global concern—and often paranoia—with
diasporic Islam, Islamic religious institutions and civil society have been portrayed
in the popular media as hotbeds of radicalism, promoters of hatred, and recruiters
for a ‘‘conflict of civilization’’ between the Muslim world and the modern world.
Having declared itself a terrorist’s ‘‘iconic target,’’ Singapore has taken a broad-
based community approach in advancing inter-religious tolerance, including a subtle
initiative to include the ‘‘Muslim civil society’’ in advancing the understanding and
the promotion of a moderate brand of Islam in Singapore. This tacit process of regu-
lation (top-down, intra-community and inter-community), while effective, is
constrained by the unique governance context in Singapore.
Keywords civil society, Islam, religion, Singapore, terrorism
Even before the advent of European colonialism, Southeast Asia had been buffeted
by Buddhist, Christian, Confucian, Hindu, and Islamic traditions brought by itiner-
ant traders and travelers from the start of the second millennium. It is no surprise
that religion has played a key role in the construction of political states, their polit-
ical legitimation, national integration, and internal tension in much of Southeast
Asia. Although at the heart of Southeast Asia, Singapore is much less affected given
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its rational and techno-bureaucratic orientation in political governance. Singapore
has enjoyed significant racial and religious harmony since securing its independence
in 1965. Undergirded by the state’s professed commitment to secularism, racial and
religious harmony is one of Singapore’s five Shared Values.1 The state acknowledges
Singaporeans’ religious faith as a major part of Singapore’s cultural heritage. It
appears that the secularization theory—understood here as a social phenomenon
in which modernization results in the decline in religious belief and the downgrading
of importance of religious institutions—is not borne out in Singapore. Given the
global phenomenon of religious resurgence amidst globalization and rapid social
change, Singapore is affected by the rise of the triumvirate of religious fundamental-
ism, powerful transnational associational pulls of renewed religiosity, and new forms
of post-traditional=new age spirituality.2
In response, the Singapore government maintains a watchful eye on external
influences and is prepared to move preemptively against any threat to social
cohesion and harmony.3 In the 1980s, liberation theology was closely watched. From
the 1990s onwards, radical and militant Islam—alongside aggressive evangelization
by any faith—is closely monitored. The government operates from the conservative
and realist premise that racial and religious harmony cannot be taken for granted
and that efforts have to be continually exerted to ensure that moderation and social
responsibility prevail in the practice of one’s faith. It is acutely aware that religion
(with Islam and Christianity holding comprehensive world views) is a powerful
instrument to rally faith communities as well as a potential tool of protest and rebel-
lion against socio-economic and political injustices, perceived or real.4 Increasingly,
there is appreciation of the need for greater interaction, grassroots support, and par-
ticipation to develop inter-religious understanding and appreciation especially at the
mass level in order to counter religious entrepreneurs. While Singaporeans’ increased
religiosity per se purportedly is not a state concern, the fact that Singaporeans,
specifically Muslims, are interacting less with Singaporeans of other faiths is of con-
cern to the government. The overarching fear and vulnerability, made more pro-
nounced since the post-September 11 ‘‘war on terror,’’ ensure that close scrutiny,
interventionist surveillance, and ultra-sensitivity to internal security concerns are
hallmarks of the government’s policy towards religion.
The article begins with a brief survey of the rich, multireligious landscape of
Singapore and notes some contemporary trends. The hitherto conspicuous absence
of an engaged civil society in Singapore’s model of secularism pre-9=11 was appar-
ent. Against the backdrop of security and terrorism as signature concerns in the
post-9=11 era, the second part of the paper examines the state’s response in the area
of ethnic relations to the terrorism threat in Singapore. It considers the introduction
of new initiatives that consciously seek to induct elements of civil society in the quest
to maintain religious harmony in Singapore. The paper then examines the various
initiatives specifically targeted at the Muslim community (a putative ‘‘Muslim
civil society’’ if you will) in combating religious extremism. The underlying premise
asserted by the powers that be is that religious radicalism is a fundamental threat
to Singapore’s ethos of multiracialism. The approach taken reflects the impulses
of globalization on Singapore and the state’s efforts in managing religion and its
potential centrifugal tendencies. The paper concludes with some critical observations
and analysis on Singapore’s endeavor to instrumentally induct civil society in the
battle against religious extremism and the larger challenge of enhancing social
resilience.
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The Religious State of Play in Singapore
Singaporeans’ religious affiliation has remained relatively stable over the last 25
years. Further, religious and racial group relations, pre- and post-September 11,
2001, are positive.5 Buddhists (42.5 percent) constitute the largest religious group,
followed by Muslims (14.9 percent), no religion (14.8 percent), Christians (14.6 per-
cent), Taoists (8.5 percent), and Hindus (4.0 percent).Buddhism and Christianity in
Singapore have experienced substantial growth in the last 25 years, with better-
educated Chinese more inclined towards Christianity. There is an emergent pattern
of Christians being of ‘‘relatively higher social-economic status (in education, occu-
pation, and income) and exerting an influence, politically, socially and economically,
far greater than the number they represent in the population.’’6 Singaporeans’
religious beliefs also tend to be divided along racial lines. For instance, 99.6 percent
of Malays are Muslims while almost two-thirds of Chinese (64.4 percent) are either
Buddhists or Taoists. Slightly more than half of Indians (55.4 percent) are Hindus.
About half of ‘‘Others’’ are Christians.7 The Chinese are also far more likely to have
no religious affiliation than Malays and Indians.
Against this backdrop is the belated but growing role of the religion sector in
public policy discourse in Singapore. This is not surprising as most Singaporeans
regard religion with some importance and will draw on their religious value
systems to inform their choices in the public realm. The government has stated that
religion-inspired feedback that is consultative have a place in Singapore’s political
discourse. Citizens motivated by religious convictions are, of course, free to offer
their moral counsel and views on policies, laws, and the performance of public insti-
tutions, and the state of morality in Singapore. This also coheres with the fundamen-
tal liberties of free speech and freedom of religion. However, the rules of engagement
are still in a developmental stage. The unresolved dilemma lies in that policy-making
sits squarely in the secular realm while religion-inspired policy feedback originates in
the religious realm. This tension was highlighted in the government’s recent proposal
to liberalize gambling laws to allow casino gaming. When announcing the decision to
overturn its long-standing ban on casino gaming, the Prime Minister acknowledged
the convictions of those who opposed casino gambling for religious reasons. While
religion-inspired feedback is welcomed, the government ultimately has to maintain
a secular and pragmatic approach in making policy decisions.8
For the minority Malay community, racial and religious identities are not only
simultaneously prominent but also conflated. As 99.6 percent of Malay-Singaporeans
profess Islam, the government regards Malays synonymously as Muslims. The
Muslim identity is treated as an integral, if not inalienable, part of the Malay identity.
This double affiliation, ‘‘Malay=Muslim’’ in official Singapore discourse, distin-
guishes the Malay community and emphasizes their distinctiveness vis-a`-vis the
non-Malays. Within the community itself, it also nurtures a greater community
consciousness of the double bond of race and faith. It is this conflation of race and
religion that constrains the closer integration of Malay=Muslims in the Singapore
Armed Forces. This stems from the government’s concern that, in the event of a con-
flict with its predominantly Muslim neighbors, primordial loyalties of ethnicity and
religion will trump the civic and secular loyalties to the Singaporean nation.9 This
is a significant bone of contention between the government and the Muslim
community. In the last three decades, the religious identifier has become even more
prominent. Although it would be misleading to equate increased religiosity of the
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Malay-Muslims with Islamism (understood here as a political ideology supportive of
Muslim political activism), the government’s concern with the Malay-Muslim way
of life in recent years is all but apparent.
The Institutional and Legal Framework
Article 15 of the Singapore Constitution provides that religious freedom is a funda-
mental liberty. As an element of limited community autonomy for the indigenous
Malay-Muslim community, limited legal pluralism is embedded in Singapore’s com-
mon law legal system wherein the shariah (Islamic law) governs Muslim personal
matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. As an overarching institutional
safeguard, the Presidential Council of Minority Rights (PCMR) was established as
a commitment to the multiracial ethos. Besides ensuring that the minorities are
not discriminated against legislatively, the PCMR also plays a key role in the
appointment of members of the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony
(PCRH). The PCRH advises the government on matters affecting the maintenance
of religious harmony. It also makes recommendations on the restraining orders
under the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act that the government may propose
against any person inciting, instigating, or encouraging any religious group to feel-
ings of enmity, hatred, ill will or hostility between different religious groups.
In the management of religious issues, the government is aided by several key pieces
of legislation, namely the Administration of Muslim LawAct, the Internal Security Act,
Societies Act, the Penal Code, the Sedition Act, and the Maintenance of Religious
Harmony Act (MRHA). In dealing with individuals and groups that pose a threat to
public order, these laws provide a variety of options, ranging from non-registra-
tion=deregistration of religious groups to preventive detention without trial. Notwith-
standing the powers given to the authorities, they also reflect the state’s abiding
concern with the power of the pulpit and its potency for the manifestation of popular
opposition and protest. In particular, the MRHA not only seeks to keep religion and
politics separate but attempts to legislate religious moderation and tolerance by keeping
religious leaders in line. It recognizes that religious elites exert a significant influence on
their religious community and that the laity can be led astray by extremist clergy.
The coercive, preemptive legislative regime nestles with a plethora of state insti-
tutions overseeing the religious realm. The state exerts a significant influence on the
administration of Islam, Sikhism, and Hinduism through the power to appoint some
or all office-bearers in the statutory bodies that are established to manage various
aspects of these minority faiths. Even then, the state does not seek to provide theo-
logical input or attempt to engage in the intricacies of the laws, doctrines, and
philosophies undergirding the different faiths. The most extensive influence is exer-
cised on theMajlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS or the Islamic Religious Council)
wherein all office-bearers are appointed by the government. The Chairman of MUIS
is the Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs, a Cabinet-ranked appointment. In
recent years, the Inter-Religious Organization (IRO), a non-government organiza-
tion representing ten different faiths, has been actively included in the government’s
efforts to promote greater religious understanding and harmony.
While secularism is a core governance belief, it can be seen that Singapore is not
a dogmatic secular state. Due to the pragmatic-realist approach in Singapore’s
governance and particularly after 9=11, it is even more conscious that religion and
politics are not distinct spheres of influence and experience even as it strives to keep
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them distinct and separate. As religions tend to encompass comprehensive world
views on all dimensions of human existence, the Singapore political leadership has
been acutely aware of the power of religion to mobilize, to motivate, and to enforce
behavior, values, and norms among the faithful.
The Specter of Religious Extremism? Engaging Civil Society
Fear of Homegrown Terrorism: Islam in the Spotlight
Religious issues pertaining to Islam in Singapore continue to present their specific
challenges to the government and are regularly profiled in the official discourse.
From the 1990s onwards, given the strong accent of Islamic revivalism globally
including Indonesia and Malaysia,10 the Singapore government paid even closer
attention to the religious dimension of the Malay-Muslim community life. In parti-
cular, the apparent re-Islamization in daily life—not just outward behavior but also
inward attitudes and values—led to the government’s primary concern of the poten-
tial formation of a closed Malay-Muslim community. This is in contrast to the
Malay-Muslim community’s self-perception that its increased religiosity stems from
a spiritual self-renewal rather than the insistence of a particularized Islamic system of
values and ethics or vulnerability towards a militant, violent brand of jihadism. In the
current security climate, increased Muslim religiosity has become securitized.11
Simply put, the terrorist threat from within is an explicit security issue with
Muslim-Singaporeans’ apparent susceptibility to radical and militant Islam being
the key concern. In particular, the multiracial framework seems to be under strain
in dealing with the Malay-Muslims’ expression of conservatism and increased
religiosity. Then Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew observed that:
In keeping with a world-wide trend, over the last three decades many
Muslims in Singapore and the region are becoming stricter in their dress,
diet, religious observances, and even social interaction, especially with
non-Muslims. Increasingly Muslim women will not shake hands with
men. The generation of convivial and easy-to-get-along-with Muslim
leaders in the region has given way to successors who observe a stricter
Islamic code of conduct. My original concern was over the growing
separateness of our Muslim community, as Singaporean Muslims tended
to congregate for their social and extra-mural activities in their mosques,
instead of in multi-racial community clubs. What came as a shock was
that this heightened religiosity facilitated Muslim terror groups linked to
Al-Qaeda to recruit Singapore Muslims into their network.12
The arrest and detention of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist suspects in Singapore
under the Internal Security Act in late 2001 and early 2002 created an atmosphere of
mutual suspicion and distrust between Malay-Muslims and non-Muslims.13 The
Malay-Muslims were themselves confronted by self-doubt and ambivalence. The
government worried about the negative impact the JI arrests would have on
Singapore’s multiracial and multireligious society. In the January 2003 parliamentary
debate on the ‘‘The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism’’ White
Paper, the discussion of the terrorist threat was notable for the articulation of a
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subtle moral panic which obliquely linked increased Islamic religiosity and perceived
Malay-Muslim separateness with increased susceptibility towards terrorism. The
official articulation highlighted the concern with the Muslims’ supposed exclusionary
practices and self-segregation, and the formation of an isolated ‘‘micro-community’’
accompanied by the unilateral closing of common space. This panic prompted the then
MUIS President to observe:
Not only did it [the Muslim-Singaporean community] have to grapple with
the shocking revelation that some members of the community were
involved in insidious activities that threatened society’s peace and
harmony, it also had to contend with unrelenting public scrutiny over the
tenability of Islamic practices in a modern, secular and multiethnic polity.14
On another occasion, the Minister in charge of Muslim Affairs remarked that:
Practices of the Malay community, which have evolved naturally, became
the subject of scrutiny. There was even some questioning as to whether
these practices were desirable or otherwise. A community, which had
hitherto lived peacefully with other communities found itself the subject
of discussion by all – with some participants taking their reference points
from outside the Singapore context. The local context did not matter as
we were swathed with exciting stories of terrorism and extremism
prefaced by the word ‘Islamic’ supplied by overnight experts. There were
increased concerns and questions about the implications of overt symbols
and signs of Muslim identity and beliefs. Some wondered why Muslims
needed to consume food that was halal (or permitted) as though it was
a radical behavioral departure. Observing religions practices became a
sort of shorthand for hovering at the edge of terrorism.15
Quite evidently, the key challenge post-9=11 is to adeptly manage the Malay-
Muslim Singaporeans’ increased religiosity, their perception of being under siege,
as well as the non-Muslim apprehension, fears, and misunderstanding of Islam
and Muslim-Singaporeans. The tenor of the political leadership’s exhortations has
consistently been that the Muslim community practice their faith in the context of
a multiracial society with moderation as the defining attribute. The latest emphasis
on reaching out to the ‘‘Muslim civil society’’ seeks to manage the perceived exclu-
sivism within the Malay-Muslim community. This outreach is a subset of the larger
ongoing attempt to involve and engage civil society in dealing with religious extrem-
ism, ignorance, and prejudice through regular inter-faith dialogue, confidence-build-
ing, and the establishment of desired norms in the practice of one’s faith.
The stark realization that inter-racial ties were not as healthy as they should be
prompted the government to chart new directions to engender better inter-ethnic
understanding. In the heightened post-9=11 environment, the government was
concerned that the social fabric, while strong, may not withstand the impact of a
terrorist attack in Singapore. In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, social resentment
and religious insecurity can easily be expressed through hatred and violence and
justified on religious grounds. Increasingly cognizant that a coercive legislative
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framework has its limitations, the government moved carefully to clothe the concept
of tolerance in a more tangible manner in the immediate aftermath of these arrests.
The initial confidence-building efforts took two principal forms: the formation of the
Inter-Racial Confidence Circles (IRCCs) in January 2002 at the constituency level,
and the unveiling of the Declaration of Religious Harmony in June 2003.
Even as institutional mechanisms remain the dominant focus, this refreshing
promotion of inter-faith dialogue and understanding at various levels emphasizes
that inter-faith grassroots relations are as critical as inter-faith relations among
the religious elites. Operating under the auspices of the government-linked Citizens’
Consultative Committees, the IRCCs comprise leaders of the various racial,
religious, social, educational, and business groups and organizations in each con-
stituency who are appointed by their Members of Parliament. The IRCCs are meant
to be an intimate, grassroots-oriented platform to build and to strengthen the trust
and confidence among the different races and to establish a viable grassroots mech-
anism to deal with serious racial or religious problems on the ground. Should there
be a terrorist attack in Singapore, their mission is to ensure that the various com-
munity leaders can work together to contain the damage and quickly re-establish
trust and confidence. The IRCCs have organized activities such as visits to places
of worship and the celebration of festivities to facilitate inter-ethnic learning and
appreciation. The IRCCs are complemented by the more informal Harmony Circles
in schools, work places, and other social organizations.
The Declaration of Religious Harmony (DRH) is another initiative that seeks to
educate and engage the civil society while attempting to circumscribe the perimeters
or moderate the conduct of the religious elites and their followers in the religious
realm (see Appendix 1). Although the DRH is a non-legislative, non-enforceable
document, the government-led efforts to craft a code of conduct of sorts were in
essence an attempt to exert moral suasion on the religious leaders and believers alike
to practice moderation in their faiths fully sensitive to the multireligious realities and
secular constraints inherent in the Singapore polity. The notion of tolerance needed
to be unpacked so that the rules of religious conduct are clearly laid out, shared and
understood by Singaporeans.16 Although the first draft of the DRH was provided by
the state and subsequently worked on by selected religious elites, the intent was to
induct one segment of civil society (viz the religious elites) in generating consensus
and buy-in on the ground rules. With time, it is hoped that these principles would
be internalized and develop into socio-political norms that would strengthen the
secular and multireligious character of Singapore. The ad-hoc working group delib-
erated between October 2002 and February 2003. In June 2003, the DRH was
unveiled, a tangible manifestation of the fledgling attempt at concretizing the guiding
principles from which consensus-building and norm-building can evolve.17 Follow-
ing on from this was the creation of the Inter-Religion Harmony Circle, consisting
of representatives of all major faiths in Singapore, to build on the inter-faith dialo-
guing established in the earlier DRH consultations and discussions.
The Community Engagement Program
While one cannot deny the role of the IRCCs and DRH in confidence building, the
top-down nature suggests that the state continues to assert itself as an indispensable
intermediary in facilitating better inter-racial and inter-religious understanding. This
ensures that the government continues to exert a measure of control and influence
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over issues of race and religion. Such a development is not surprising. The state’s
dominance in ethnic relations, through its top-down approach, has affected the
nature of inter-racial and inter-religious understanding. Genuine inter-ethnic
understanding cannot be engendered by artificially induced interactions. Yet the
unease and fear that social cohesion and resilience is fragile prompted the govern-
ment to explore other means of enhancing inter-ethnic relations. Indeed, having
declared itself ‘‘an iconic target,’’ Singapore is gearing itself for the inevitability of
a terrorist attack on Singapore soil.18 In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, especially
by homegrown perpetrators, the primary concern for policy-makers is the potential
backlash against the Muslim community and the unraveling of Singapore’s social
fabric. This overriding fear took on added urgency following the London bombings
by homegrown British terrorists in July 2005.
The Prime Minister has acknowledged that the multifaceted challenges posed by
the post-9=11 security environment is ‘‘by far the most serious [security problem] that
we have faced since the communist problem.’’19 Since the latter half of 2005, the char-
acterization of the terrorist threat has moved away from the somewhat over-indulgent
and unenlightening focus on the ‘‘right, moderate Islam.’’ There is now official recog-
nition that maintaining social cohesion and resilience requires a two-way process at
various levels: between state and civil society, between political and religious elites,
between religious elites and their followers, and between elites and followers of the
various faiths. In the clearest demonstration of the need for Muslims and non-
Muslims to take collective responsibility, invest and be engaged in enhancing social
cohesion, the Prime Minister issued a timely corrective (emphasis mine):
. . . [W]e must know that this is not a Malay-Muslim problem. This is a
national problem and non-Muslims also have to play your part, for
example, by preserving the space for minorities in the majority-Chinese
society by upholding the ideals of meritocracy and equal opportunity
and treatment, regardless of race, language and religion and by clearly
distinguishing the small number of extremists who are a threat to us from
the majority of moderate, rational, loyal Muslim Singaporeans with
whom we work together to tackle a shared problem. And this way, we
can build confidence and trust between the different communities and
the best time to do that is now when we don’t have a crisis. This is
because building trust takes time and it requires frequent interaction
between leaders and members of the public and between leaders of differ-
ent groups and it underlines the importance of our integrating our hous-
ing estates, our schools, National Service and everyday life.20
It was in this context that the Community Engagement Program (CEP) was launched
in February 2006.21 The CEP is now the centre-piece of the endeavor to ensure that
Singapore has adequate social capital and social resilience to withstand threats to
its social fabric posed by terrorist acts. The CEP is envisaged to be civil society-driven
with an extensive and all-embracing outreach. Activities and ideas under the CEP are
to come from the grassroots and multiple sectoral partners such as the grassroots, the
religious and community organizations, schools, businesses, unions, and the media.
The CEP seeks to widen and deepen the linkages among Singaporeans at multiple
levels by involving more people through bottom-up initiatives for civil society owner-
ship and building on the networks developed by the IRCCs.
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Engaging Civil Society
The Construct and Salience of the ‘‘Muslim Civil Society’’
The slew of recent initiatives such as the IRCC, DRH, and CEP seek to involve the
entire population in developing Singapore’s social and psychological defenses
against terrorism. Another aspect to the urgent forging of national resilience in
the new security environment is the government’s efforts in engaging civil society,
focusing on a significant outreach to the Muslim community. I use ‘‘Muslim civil
society’’ as a short-hand for the community of believers of Islam including the
religious teachers and leaders. Although Islam does not separate the religious from
the socio-political realms, it is possible to conceive of the faithful as constituting the
space between state and family in a secular state. It is in this space where society
resides and where the Islamic faith community debates and negotiates with the
Singapore state (whether through MUIS or not) on matters concerning their faith
and their relationship to the state.
In the battle of ideas and for the hearts and minds of believers, it is civil society
which can facilitate the overlapping consensus on the nature and content of the prac-
tice of one’s faith in a secular, multiracial society. The centrality of bringing in the
Muslim civil society reiterates the fact that the state cannot unilaterally impose its
view on a faith community’s desired practices. Instead, it highlights the patent need
for (if not commitment to) dialogue, cooperation, and trust, if the state, with civil
society, is to prevail against the violent extremists. While the consequences of a ter-
rorist attack in Singapore are dependent on the strength of civil society, much more
is still expected by the government of the Muslim civil society in Singapore. The vari-
ous efforts in engaging Muslim civil society stem from the overarching themes of
promoting moderation and a distinctive Muslim-Singaporean identity as a bulwark
against religious-inspired terrorism.
This push towards engaging the Muslim civil society incorporates the develop-
ment of a Muslim-Singaporean autochthonous practice of Islam in which emphasis
is placed on religious moderation, a sensitive recognition of multiracialism, and the
need for common space to be enlarged. The promotion of ‘‘Islamic moderation’’ and
inter-religious understanding is buttressed by the central concerns of social cohesion
and religious tolerance. Following the JI arrests, the focus had been overwhelmingly
on characterizing the religious state of play facing Muslim-Singaporeans as one of
‘‘radical versus moderate’’ Islam and the need for the Muslims to take the ‘‘moderate
path.’’22 This entails that Muslim-Singaporeans should not interpret and practice
Islam narrowly and rigidly. Further, they have to speak up against extremists and
militants who advocate intolerance and extremism. This helps ensure that the
extremist views do not gain legitimacy and currency by default as a consequence
of the silence of the moderate majority.23 The Prime Minister re-emphasized the
importance of reaching out to the moderate, mainstream Muslims:
Ultimately, the fate of extremists who claim to act in the name of Islam
will have to be decided by Muslims themselves, by reference to their own
values and interests.24
More recently, although the discourse retains the stricture of ‘‘moderate
versus radical Islam,’’ Singapore has taken a broad-based community approach in
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advancing inter-religious tolerance, and more importantly, understanding. Four
strands of the movement towards moderation and the deliberate engagement of the
Muslim civil society can be discerned. We shall consider briefly each strand in turn.
Revamping Islamic Religious Education in Singapore
Islamic religious education in Singapore can be broadly divided into the school-
based madrasah education and the part-time mosque- and community-based
religious education. The revamping of Islamic religious education in Singapore,
especially full-time madrasahs, has concentrated on the conscientious goal of devel-
oping a curriculum that is relevant to a knowledge-based economy. By the late 1990s
the government was concerned with the relative popularity of madrasah education
(even among Muslim parents with a secular education), its curriculum adequacy,
and its compatibility with the proposed national framework of compulsory edu-
cation.25 Between 1990 and 1999, total enrollment in the six full-time madrasahs
doubled to about 4,000, with girls constituting about 70 percent of the enrollment.
The total intake at the primary one level averaged 400 between 1996 and 2000.26
The government’s concerns are: first, an over-supply of religious scholars and
religious teachers for the Muslim community. Secondly, madrasah education, with
its focus on religious subjects, is inadequate to prepare those who do not become
religious teachers or scholars for jobs in the knowledge-based economy.27 In short,
the government aspires towards a madrasah educational system that is relevant to
and aligned with Singapore’s context and needs. Although this concern predated
9=11, that it coincided with the government’s planned introduction of the compul-
sory education legislation gave rise to the Muslim community’s perception that
the law was primarily targeted at undermining madrasahs and thereby threatening
a key institution of Islamic life.
After much debate, a compromise approach was taken. Children enrolled in
madrasahs are conditionally exempted from the compulsory education law. Besides
limiting the intake to 400 pupils each year, the full-time madrasahs have to meet the
requisite minimum benchmark score from the 2008 national primary school leaving
examinations. This was the minimalist approach that was acceptable to the
Malay-Muslim community. The government preferred the maximalist approach,
which would require all Muslim children to attend national primary schools with
attendance at madrasahs outside school hours.
On a larger scale, MUIS has also focused on developing all levels of Islamic
religious education through its comprehensive, age-specific Singapore Islamic
Education System (SIES) by 2010.28 The inculcation of Islamic values, rather than
rituals, is given prominence in the SIES. The SIES seeks to impart Islamic values
through innovative teaching methods and materials that will facilitate the youths’
learning more about Islam and troubles faced by their Muslim brethren in other
lands in ‘‘the proper context.’’ This is achieved through the customized ‘‘Kids
aL.I.V.E.’’ (Learning Islamic Values Everyday) and ‘‘Teens aL.I.V.E.’’ programs
for 5–8 year olds and 13–15 year olds respectively. There are two bridging programs
in ‘‘Tweens aL.I.V.E.’’ (9–12 years age group) and ‘‘Youth aL.I.V.E.’’ (for youths up
to 24 years old). A major objective is to ensure that the Muslim youth understands
the fundamentals of Islam from a young age and is safe from deviant teachings and
influences. The themes cohere around safeguarding racial and religious harmony as
well as the well-being and safety of all Singaporeans. The program will highlight
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legitimate ways of expressing concerns and sympathy (such as prayer sessions for
peace and humanitarian efforts to provide basic needs) for Muslims elsewhere.
The fight against deviant and extremist teachings and ideology is two-pronged.
The first—and a long-standing policy at that—is to require foreign religious teachers
and preachers to have MUIS’s approval before they can preach locally. The other is
to disseminate knowledge that seeks to address contested concepts such as jihad and
the role of Muslims in a secular society. The role of religious teachers here cannot be
emphasized enough. MUIS has also been actively reaching out to the Muslim
religious elites by formalizing their involvement with the faithful and developing clo-
ser linkages with the religious teachers and students. A MUIS Asatizah Recognition
Board vets an applicant’s knowledge of Islam before accrediting him as Islamic
religious teachers (asatizah) with their qualifications and areas of expertise made
known to the public. An accredited asatizah will also benefit from professional train-
ing and development opportunities offered by MUIS. The outreach extends to the
future religious elites. For example, MUIS’ Madrassah Student-Scholar program
strives to ensure that the Muslim community has a steady stream of religious leaders
who are competent, knowledgeable, and well-exposed to the demands of a globalized
modern society. In this regard, MUIS is sending its scholars to non-Islamic countries
such as Britain and Australia for non-traditional fields of study such as Islamic
finance and biomedical ethics. Through its Student Resource Development
Secretariat, MUIS reaches out to and provides advice and support to Muslim-
Singaporean students studying in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Muslim civil society efforts to counter radical and violent Islamist ideology are
also more evident in the last few years. Of note is the Religious Rehabilitation Group
(RRG) formed in 2003 and comprising 30-odd ustaz (Islamic scholars) who have
provided voluntary religious and rehabilitation counseling, as part of the overall
rehabilitation process, to the JI detainees and their families to correct their misinter-
pretation of Islam. Alongside MUIS and other Muslim organizations, the RRG has
reached out to the public to explain the misuse and abuse of Islamic teachings and
concepts by terrorists. To counter the extremist exploitation of religion, govern-
mental efforts are grossly inadequate. The Muslim religious elites with their
authority, scholarship, and standing are assiduously inducted in the effort not to
cede the middle ground to the radicals.
Remodeling Mosques
The mosque is an important socio-religious institution that forms the basis of the
community’s interactions in Singapore. In recent years, mosques are being remo-
deled as multifunctional institutions to remain relevant to a multiracial society. This
is achieved not only by making mosques more accessible to Muslim youths but by
having them serve as outreach centers for non-Muslims. This emphasis on encour-
aging Muslims to reach out to the non-Muslims entails making mosques accessible
to the larger Singaporean society. Mosque visits are organized in collaboration with
national and grassroots organizations. Another significant example is the establish-
ment of the Harmony Centre within a mosque in a residential heartland (the An-
Nahdhah Mosque) in October 2006. The Center is expected to promote inter-faith
understanding and serve as a platform for the training of youth, religious, and
community leaders involved in inter-faith relations. It also centralizes all inter-faith
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and community engagement programs carried out by the Muslim community in
Singapore.
Mosques have been tasked to engage Muslim youths and ensure that they do not
become ‘‘disenchanted, disconnected and misguided empty vessels’’ which would
render them susceptible to extremist ideology. Youth development officers are
deployed in mosques to offer mentoring and befriender services to youths. The
overarching aim is to encourage the Muslim youths to embrace a path of rationality
and moderation in their socio-religious life with emphasis on personal and social
responsibility.29 Such a revamp making mosques accessible to youths, family, and
the Muslim community requires the reorganization and professionalization of mos-
que management. MUIS has also enhanced its presence on the ground to ramp up
the mosques’ ability to deliver Islamic learning in the endeavor to create a religiously
resilient Muslim community.
Engendering (Inter- and Intra-) Civilizational Dialogue
Third, there are governmental efforts in providing a platform for religious moderates
to share their thoughts locally and internationally. This support for intra-faith and
inter-faith dialogue extends to inter-civilizational dialogue between Asia and the
Middle East. In the last three years, the Singapore government has actively sought
to engage the Muslim world in the Arab Middle East, Turkey, and northern Africa.
It reflects a mindset and political sensitivity that is increasingly attuned to the inter-
national networks that bind the ummah (global Muslim brotherhood) and their
impact on local Muslims.30 Notwithstanding the economic benefits flowing from such
diplomatic overtures, there is also the concomitant benefit of Singapore being seen as
a friend of moderate Middle Eastern governments. This has a positive affective effect
on the local Muslim community, potentially validating the governments efforts in
norming Islamic ‘‘moderation.’’ As part of its aspirations to be an inter-faith hub,
Singapore was a prime mover of the Asia-Middle East Dialogue (AMED); the first
meeting was held in Singapore in June 2005.31 Besides forging closer political, eco-
nomic, and socio-cultural relations, the AMED provides a platform for opinion-
makers from the two regions to articulate the moderation they practice, underline
the significance of dialogue as well as to present a united front against terrorism.32
In line with its effort of promoting dialogue within the diasporic Islamic
communities, MUIS has partnered Islam Online.net (IOL), one of the largest and
most reputable Muslim media platforms with a global audience.33 Effective from
January 2006, this partnership allows MUIS to tap the resources and reach of
IOL to highlight moderate and mainstream views of Islam in various Islamic com-
munities globally. MUIS intends to use the IOL to showcase and share Singapore’s
experience of managing an innovative and progressive minority Muslim community
within a secular and globalized state. This aspiration to establish Singapore as a
‘‘useful model’’ for other Muslim minority communities also has the desired effect
of reinforcing the validity and legitimacy of the government’s management of
Muslim-Singaporeans.
Forging a Distinctive Muslim Singaporean Identity
Perhaps the most salient strand in the preemptive movement towards norming
moderation is the endeavor to mould the Muslim-Singaporean identity as one that
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is congruent with Islamic values and with progressive attributes consonant with the
political realities in Singapore. To this end, the MUIS has been actively promoting a
‘‘Muslim Community of Excellence.’’ To further nurture an autochthonous
Muslim-Singaporean way of life, MUIS commenced the Singapore Muslim Identity
(SMI) project in early 2005. The SMI project seeks to ‘‘facilitate religious life in a
multiracial multireligious society with a secular government’’ and embodies the
‘‘Ten Desired Attributes of Singapore Muslim Community of Excellence’’ (see
Appendix 2). These attributes seek to help Muslim-Singaporeans understand and
excel in their dual roles and identities as Muslims and citizens. The mission is to craft
an identity that is not only religiously profound but also socially progressive and
therefore conducive to a secular, multiracial, and multireligious Singapore.34 The
government promptly gave its imprimatur for the SMI project which is also seen
as bolstering national security:
The Singapore Muslim community has made great strides in forging a
unique Muslim identity shaped by a deep conviction in Islam and fos-
tered by Singapore’s unique context of a pluralistic and progressive
society and a globalized and secular state. The Singapore Muslim identity
is rooted in the principle that Muslims faithful to Islam can play
an important and integrative role as active citizens in a secular
Singapore . . .. Singapore’s context of a multi-religious society and
modern, globalized and secular state is unique. It exerts an influence over
the religious life of the Muslim community. A Muslim community’s
integration with other communities in a secular state is key to reducing
suspicion and mistrust.35
Discussion
Singapore’s initial response in the aftermath of the JI arrests and detentions in 2002
put Muslim-Singaporeans in an unduly harsh spotlight for their not countering the
radical and militant elements in their community. Given the threat assessments, the
hardnosed security approach pivoting on counter-terrorism measures persists. Yet
the conscious undertaking now is to make the response to the terrorism threat more
holistic. This involves a deliberate policy of re-calibration and leavening towards a
broad-based community approach concentrating on the Muslim civil society but also
inducting the non-Muslim communities in engendering religious harmony and inter-
communal trust. The imperative to enhance social cohesion and resilience necessi-
tates a strategic engagement of the Muslim community as well as religious elites
across all faiths. Singapore’s Prime Minister put squarely the inherent vulnerability
and the emphatic challenge facing the country:
The gravest threat to our harmony is a terrorist attack here. Such an
attack will put our ethnic relations under severe strain. This is what
happened in Britain after the London bombings last July . . .. If ever there
is an attack in Singapore, it will severely damage not just our physical
infrastructure, but also the harmonious ethnic relations that underpin
our existence as a nation. This is why in Singapore we have worked hard
to reinforce inter-faith awareness and understanding, so that in a crisis
the community network will hold our society together.36
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The jury is still out as to whether the recent policies and initiatives will be
successful in promoting religious moderation within the Muslim community and
enhancing social resilience. The more recent arrests of more alleged JI suspects,
including a ‘‘self-radicalized’’ Singaporean in early 2007, did not arouse the same
level of suspicion and doubt as did the earlier rounds of arrests. In crafting its overall
response to the terror threat, the political leadership and policy-makers need to be
fully alive to the reality that terrorist threats have been used as a convenient excuse
in other countries for potentially oppressive policy initiatives, disguised as being
essential for a safer and secure society. Trust remains a fundamental attribute in
the meaningful regulation of religious anxieties and the state’s response to the terror-
ist threat. Moreover, the strategic thrust to unleash the capacity of civil society in
thwarting the terror threat patently needs to be bottom-up if sustainable bonds
are to be developed. The official logic and reasoning behind the raison d’etre of
the various policy initiatives, while rational and seemingly persuasive, do not mask
the fact that the strategic mindset of national security considerations requires the
mutual trust between government and the Malay-Muslim community. This is parti-
cularly important since the salient belief among the political elites—of the Muslims’
supposed susceptibility to radical and militant Islam—persists.
Nevertheless, several features stand out in the Singapore state’s gradual embrac-
ing of the religious civil society in building social resilience. First, the Singapore state
remains deeply involved in religious matters: a tacit recognition that the secular state
may be challenged by a largely non-secularized society. The government has con-
sciously sought to partner stakeholders in the religion sector in the state- and
nation-building agenda even as it ensures that religion does not enter the political
domain. It seeks to align the thinking of the various faith communities, especially
Muslims, on the role that religion can play in nation-building through a tolerant,
moderate understanding and practice of religious life. In particular, the accent is
on stressing the compatibility of Muslim and Singaporean identities. Overall, all
the recent programs seeking to inculcate the norm of moderation are aligned with
the approach of actively encouraging the Malay-Muslim community to see itself
as an integral part of Singapore.
Second, the Singapore state is increasingly alive to the reality that religion,
through its unique structure and rules, is a form of communal action. Faith com-
munities, through the rationalization of their faith-motivated attitudes, can support
or obstruct different types of social interactions in the secular world. This demands
that the government actively and constructively engages not only with the religious
elites but more so with the grassroots and civil society. The DRH and CEP projects
are evidence that the government is acutely alive to the severe limitations of an overly
legalistic approach to managing religious extremism and regulating faith communi-
ties in a religiously sensitized environment.
Third, there is the realization and recognition that social cohesion cannot be
enforced unilaterally and in a top-down manner. The buy-in from the larger com-
munity is vital if there is to be comprehensive ownership and sustainable support
by non-Muslims and Muslims alike in the quest to enhance Singapore’s social resili-
ence. The ‘‘many helping hands’’ approach in the CEP involving key stakeholders,
especially within the Muslim community, and the use of various communication
media (viz Internet, public forums, and discussion platforms) demonstrates a
conscientious attempt to have multifaceted community engagement and buy-in as
an investment on social capital. Yet the minimalist structure of the CEP and its
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encouragement of bottom-up initiatives does not understate the program’s central
coordinating role overseen by a government ministerial committee. Nevertheless,
the growing recognition given to the role of civil society and the critical need for
the majority Chinese community to work with the minority Muslim community is
a step forward and moves away from the knee-jerk tendency of blaming the Muslims
and questioning their commitment to Singapore. The CEP complements the con-
certed effort to enlist the Muslim civil society in developing sustainable social
resilience.
Fourth, in spite of the prominence given to the role of Muslim civil society, the
distinction between public and private life is, at the same time, jealously guarded.
For the government, the enlarging of the ‘‘common space’’ is a means of ensuring
that the public sphere is not unduly burdened with the identity markers of religion,
language, and race creeping in to hinder meaningful interaction. The effort at remo-
deling the mosques in Singapore into multifunctional institutions and reaching out
to non-Muslims is a case in point. The Singapore political leadership recognizes that
the mosque is firmly entrenched not merely as a religious institution but also as a
social institution providing a range of educational, health, and other programs cater-
ing to Muslims. MUIS, which administers most of the 68 mosques in Singapore, is
leveraging on this core identity to ‘‘turn mosques into multifunctional institutions as
part of the vision of creating an excellent Muslim community.’’37 This functional
‘‘remodeling’’ of mosques emphasizes their role in contributing to religious har-
mony, inter-faith understanding, and national integration through inter-faith collab-
oration with non-Muslim religious and community organizations. The DRH and
CEP also embrace the goal of enlarging the common space.
Fifth, while Singapore sees political and economic virtue as a self-ascribed
civilizational cipher, this move towards enhancing ties with the Muslim world
demonstrates the government’s strategic receptiveness towards managing and under-
standing the transnational influence on the local Muslim population. A tangible
outcome from closer ties with the Arab world was the apparent amelioration of
Singapore’s concern with Wahabbism in Saudi Arabia.38 Singapore has since
enhanced its diplomatic representation in Riyadh in a bid to better understand Saudi
Arabia and the region. This helps keep the Singapore government attuned to and
better informed of the nuances in developments in the Middle East.
A more aspirational goal is for Singapore to mediate between the Western and
Islamic worlds where the ‘‘clash of civilizations’’ discourse tends to permeate.
Cognizant of the Muslim ambivalence and resentment in Southeast Asia and glo-
bally towards America, Singapore has urged the United States to appreciate and
respond to the deeply felt feelings of the ummah on America’s Middle East policies
which are perceived to be pro-Israel. Singapore believes that a balanced approach by
the U.S. towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a perennial bugbear in relations
between the U.S. and the Islamic=Arab world, can dampen the ability of that conflict
to be a rallying cause of Islamist terrorism.39 A failure to respond adequately and
promptly enough would seriously undermine the ideological component in the
U.S.-led collective war against terrorism.
Although Singapore is under no illusion that the resolution of the
Israel-Palestinian problem will make Islamist extremist ideology redundant, it is
alive to the reality that transnational developments within the ummah can have an
impact upon the anxieties of the local Muslim community vis-a`-vis the perceived
injustice and fear suffered by their brethren elsewhere. AMED, Singapore’s
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brainchild, recognizes that militant Islamists draw connections between local issues
and global politics involving the Muslim world, and that threats perceived by the
ummah can create potential support for terrorism. AMED presents an additional
platform for the voice of moderation to be reinforced. Furthermore, AMED is as
much an effort to project Singapore’s putative soft power in the Muslim world as
it is to counter-balance the fact that Singapore is a staunch U.S. partner in the
‘‘war against terror.’’40
Conclusion
In the post-9=11 age, it is a cliche´ that states must take matters of faith seriously. In
Singapore, keeping God in place is always a work-in-progress given the subtleties
and complexities in which religion has had an impact on public life and, in turn,
is being affected by public life. The transnational characteristic of religion, embodied
in a global imagined community of faith believers, coupled with the revival tenden-
cies in all major faiths, are critical developments that impinge upon Singapore’s
quest to maintain ethnic and religious harmony.
Singapore’s earlier focus on dichotomizing the moderate and radical elements of
Islamic faith perhaps exaggerated the image and perception of Muslim-Singaporeans
as being susceptible to religious radicalism. Fortunately, this discourse has now
taken a backseat and a more inclusive approach has been adopted. Had the govern-
ment persisted in putting the terrorist threat at the feet of the Muslim community, it
would have marginalized the ‘‘moderates’’ who are needed to form the bulwark in
the proverbial battle for the hearts and minds of Muslims. In dealing with the threat
of extremism of any religious hue in Singapore’s context, the role of civil society, as
an hitherto untapped resource, is increasingly critical and appreciated. The tendency
of governments to ‘‘know it all’’ and focus on the relevant target community can
have detrimental policy implications.41 Equally important is the patent need to
engage civil society. By their very nature, religiously-inspired ideas cannot be
hemmed in by military threats and action, draconian laws, and coercive rhetoric.
Given their potential appeal to the faithful, the strategy is to challenge those ideas
head on in the marketplace of ideas. This requires the equally important vanguard
action of strengthening society that terror entrepreneurs seek to fragment, if not
to impose their nihilism upon. Post-9=11, a civil society engaged and manifested
through greater citizenry involvement and trust of fellow citizens and the govern-
ment can play a critical role in combating the destructive ideas and heinous acts that
mislead, threaten, and divide our societies.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1
‘‘Declaration on Religious Harmony’’
(9 June 2003)
WE, the people in Singapore, declare that religious harmony is vital for peace,
progress and prosperity in our multiracial and multireligious Nation.
We resolve to strengthen religious harmony through mutual tolerance, confidence,
respect and understanding.
We shall always:
Recognize the secular nature of our State,
Promote cohesion within our society,
Respect each other’s freedom of religion,
Grow our common space while respecting our diversity,
Foster inter-religious communications, and thereby ensure that religion will not
be abused to create conflict and disharmony in Singapore.
Appendix 2
Ten Desired Attributes of Singapore
Muslim Community of Excellence
(with respect to socio-religious life)
1. Holds strongly to Islamic principles while adapting to changing context.
2. Morally and spiritually strong to be on top of the challenges of modern society.
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3. Progressive, practices Islam beyond forms=rituals and rides the modernization
wave.
4. Appreciates Islamic civilization and history, and has good understanding of
contemporary issues.
5. Appreciates other civilizations and is self-confident to interact and learn from
other communities.
6. Believes that good Muslims are also good citizens.
7. Well-adjusted as contributing members of a multireligious society and secular
state.
8. Be a blessing to all and promotes universal principles and values.
9. Inclusive and practices pluralism, without contradicting Islam.
10. Be a model and inspiration to all.
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